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ARCTIC 
The Origin of Canol’s  Mackenzie Air Fields 
BY RICHARD S .  FINNIE’ 
This account of the Canol’s Mackenzie air fields is based on personal diaries and reflects the 
author’s  participation from the spring of 1942 to the summer of 1945. 
In her interesting article, “ ‘Punch’  Dickins  and the Origin  of 
Canol’s  Mackenzie Air Fields” (Arctic, Dec. ’79), P. S .  Barry concludes with 
several questions to which she failed to find answers. She surmised that if 
there were any, they would require a search of formerly “classified” 
government and military documents pertaining to Canol. Sources of 
information she drew from  were reports, letters, magazine articles, and one 
book (Canol, my impersonal pictorial history of the project). Few of her 
sources of information  had first-hand familiarity  with the subject. I did, and 
had she queried me I  could  have answered most of her questions and  clarified 
her facts. 
Toward the end of  May 1942 at my home near Ottawa I received a 
telephone call  from my friend Vilhjalmur Stefansson in  New  York.  With  him 
in  his  office,  seeking  his advice as an Arctic explorer and author, were several 
top men  in a pro-tem partnership of  American  engineering-construction 
companies to be known as Bechtel-Price-Callahan.  One of them  came on the 
line and said, “I’ve just read your new book, Canada  Moves North. Dr. 
Stefansson recommends  you  highly for your  up-to-date  knowledge of an area 
where we have a War Department contract to undertake a secret defence 
project. We’ve had no experience in northern Canada, so we’d like to hire 
you as a liaison officer and consultant to help get the project started. How 
soon can you leave for Edmonton?” 
I was the first Canadian  employed on the Canol Project, and became one of 
only  a  handful  of Canadians and  Americans  who  were  intimately associated 
with it in all of its phases and in all areas of activity from conception to 
completion  two years later. 
Stefansson and 1,  in newspaper and magazine articles, had  been  advocating 
utilization of the Norman Wells field, then the most  northerly  producing  oil 
field  in North America, as  an emergency source of fuel for the protection of 
Alaska and northwestern Canada after the outbreak of World War 11, thus 
possibly  providing inspiration in Washington for what  was  called the Canol 
Project - Canol  being an acronym for Canadian  Oil,  not  “Canadian  Norman 
Oil Line,” as Ms. Barry has it. 
She states,  “The Canol Project was the first major  intrusion of 
industrial-age activities in0 the Mackenzie District since commercial  whaling 
collapsed  in 1911; its effects were felt all the way to the Arctic Coast.” There 
was never much  whaling  within the Mackenzie District, and the main 
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rendezvous for Western Arctic whalers in Canada  was Herschel Island, which 
belongs to the Yukon. Apart from that, how about the initial  Norman  Wells 
development  from 1919 to 1925? And  how about the brisk  mining operations 
on Great Bear Lake through the 1930’s, resulting  in the further development 
of Norman  Wells and the plying  of  new boats and  barges  along the Mackenzie 
River  system  and Great Bear Lake to deliver freight  and  fuel to the Eldorado 
uranium  mine at Cameron  Bay  and  nearby  mineral  exploration camps? These 
were major industrial intrusions in their day, though  dwarfed  by  Canol. 
As for the cost of Canol, which  was  officially $134 million  but  which  may 
well have exceeded that substantially if all peripheral military expenditures 
were included: the over-all cost applied  not  only to the Mackenzie  District but 
also to the Yukon and Alaska. It was spent to build and service nearly a 
thousand miles of products pipelines up and down the Alaska Highway 
between Watson Lake and Fairbanks and a spur between Whitehorse and 
Skagway,  besides the 577-mile crude oil line  from  Norman  Wells to 
Whitehorse, a refinery at Whitehorse, and  all  supporting  facilities  such as the 
landing strips, access roads and a telephone line over the main  Canol route. 
Even though such wartime projects, prosecuted hurriedly without sufficient 
advance planning, are bound to be expensive and  wasteful,  Canol  now  seems 
relatively cheap - even considering thirty years of inflation - in comparison 
with  today’s  800-mile Prudhoe Bay-Valdez  oil  line  costing  eight or nine billion 
dollars. 
What is historically  significant about Canol is that it  was the forerunner of 
all large-scale petroleum-development and long-distance pipeline projects in 
northwestern Canada and Alaska. 
THE ORIGIN OF THE  AIRFIELDS 
I was  plunged into a rapid succession of events after my arrival in 
Edmonton just after midnight on May 28, 1942, along with a colonel  in the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Theodore Wyman, Jr., who  was to be officer 
in  charge.  Wyman  told  me that speed was of the essence, that 
northward-bound engineer battalions and civilian craftsmen would soon be 
pouring  into Edmonton, followed  by thousands of tons of freight  required for 
the construction of a crude oil  pipeline  from  Norman  Wells to Whitehorse, 
where there was to be a new  refinery to help  fuel the Alaska  Highway  and its 
airports - all  within six months. 
Neither he nor any  members of his  staff  had ever been  in the North, and 
they had no inkling that the time limit set for them by equally uninformed 
Washington planners would  not be met. 
Having covered much of the Mackenzie District several times  in  previous 
years as a writer, explorer and film-maker, I was well acquainted and had 
traveled with many men who were veterans there in various fields, such as 
river transportation, winter  oad  building  and maintenance, bush  flying, 
surveying, and camp construction and  management,  among other things. 
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During  my first week or so in Edmonton my chief  task  was to round  up  all 
of the competent Canadians I could find to help in what I supposed was a 
patriotic effort for the defence of Canada and  Alaska  against the Japanese, 
whose forces were already moving  toward the Aleutian Islands. 
A high-priority  assignment  was to arrange a charter for a suitable  plane on 
floats to carry key men from Norman Wells across the Mackenzie-Yukon 
divide to Whitehorse to scout a route for the porposed pipeline. No direct 
flight  had ever been made between those two points. Grant  McConachie,  then 
western manager for the newly-formed  Canadian  Pacific  Airlines and later its 
president, was  particularly cooperative and we  had numerous consultations in 
the Macdonald Hotel, where we were temporarily quartered. 
He volunteered to select a plane and crew for this initial reconnaissance 
flight over vaguely-mapped country. Indeed, he  would  pilot the plane  himself 
if  he could spare time  from  his  managerial  responsipibilies.  (As  it turned out, 
he flew as far as Norman Wells, where pressures of business elsewhere 
obliged him to turn the controls over to James [Bud] Potter for the run to 
Whitehorse on the 12th  of June.) Among the younger  bush pilots, 
McConachie was one of. the most imaginative and knowledgeable in regard 
not  only to flying under all conditions but also to transportation problems in 
general. It was he who pioneered the route from Edmonton to Whitehorse, 
with  his  Yukon Southern airline, that determined the route for the building of 
the Alaska  Highway  and its airports. 
On June 2nd I told  him about the tremendous tonnages of freight the U.S. 
Army Engineers expected to push down the Mackenzie River by boat and 
barge  by the end of the present open season. He expressed doubt that it  could 
be  done at all, and  went on to say that even if it  took  longer there would  have 
to be the support of large cargo planes of the DC-3 type, and they needed 
landing fields. At that time there was  no  real  landing strip in the whole of the 
Mackenzie District. The bush planes that had always served with. skis in 
winter  and pontoons in summer since the 1920's were fine for exploration and 
for carrying a few passengers and a little  freight,  but  they  had to be  grounded 
for north and south flights in the interim periods between break-up and 
freeze-up. Only planes on wheels  could  be  used for uninterrupted service the 
year around. 
If Colonel Wyman could commandeer some DC-3s through the U.S. War 
Department, C.P.  Air  could furnish pilots, mechanics and other technicians. 
McConachie added that our mutual friend A.M. (Matt) Berry, one of the 
foremost old-time Canadian bush  pilots and a winner of the McKee Trophy, 
could  be entrusted with  locating  all necessary fields. If the colonel  could  lend 
him a half-dozen  bulldozers  and 300 men,  he  could  have the fields operational 
within two months. 
Matt was already supervising the clearing and grading of a field at Fort 
McMurray, Alberta, for C.P. Air. It was  nearing  completion,  and  he  was to 
go next to Fort Smith, just within the Northwest Territories border, to start 
another for the company. McConachie  rapidly  named other strategic 
locations: Fort Chipewyan, Fort Resolution, Fort Providence, Fort Wrigley 
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and  Norman  Wells. He declared that if he were asked to do so he  could  run a 
daily service between Edmonton and Norman  Wells  aith three or four DC-3s, 
carrying personnel, freight and even line pipe. For such planes a clearing a 
mile  long  and 500-1000 feet in  width, in  line  with the prevailing  wind,  would 
be adequate. 
“What the colonel’s  got to do is get  formal  permission  from the Canadian 
government to build the fields wherever he wants them,” McConachie 
remarked. (Colonel  Wyman,  not  noted for his tact or diplomacy, apparently 
overlooked this nicety, as Ms. Barry indicated in her article. However, the 
colonel may have assumed that his superiors in Washington would take 
appropriate action.) 
I at once shared McConachie’s enthusiasm. If the colonel  could  be 
convinced that the fields were needed, it  might  be a long-range  boon to C.P. 
Air as well as  other carriers, but I was sure that McConachie  had  no ulterior 
motive  in  trying to further the Canol Project. My own  thought  was that the 
fields  would  both  aid the wartime project and  become  peacetime assets to the 
Mackenzie District at no cost to Canada. 
On the morning of June 6th, McConachie  had a twin-engine  Barkley-Grow 
plane on floats ready for the reconnaissance party at Cooking Lake near 
Edmonton. He was at the controls with Jack Rennie as mechanic. Besides 
myself as observer and photographer, the passengers included a construction 
manager and a petroleum engineer, both  Americans  who  had  never  been in 
the North, and Guy H. BlanChet, Dominion Lands Surveyor. I had brought 
Blanchet out of semi-retirement in  Victoria  and  hired him for the project. He 
had spent many years in northern exploration and  mapping for the Canadian 
government. It was  he  who selected the basic  pipeline route with a ground as 
well as air traverse, and later became  chief of surveys for the project. 
Reaching Fort McMurray that afternoon, we  immediately  sought out 
Colonel  Wyman,  who  was overseeing the arrival of troops and the setting  up 
of a tent camp for them in an area known as The Prairie  between there and 
rail  head at Waterways. (I had  queried  him  by  telegraph  in advance, and  he 
had  replied that he would confer with  me  and my party.) I introduced Grant 
McConachie to him, and he  listened  intently to the air field  recommendation. 
Matt Berry was present with the rest of us and occasionally joined in the 
conversation to back  up  McConachie. 
At first the colonel seemed noncommittal, protesting that he could only 
follow instructions from his superiors, but McConachie  wasn’t a “Bush Pilot 
With a Brief Case” for nothing (the title of a biography  published after his 
death.) He was a big man with a winning smile, amiable, personable and 
persuasive, and he clearly  knew  his subject. It did  not take long for Wyman to 
act. Within a few weeks Matt Berry, assisted by  George  Dalziel, a younger 
bush  pilot  and ex-trapper, was  laying out landing strips at all of the locations 
previously  named  by  McConachie to me, plus intermediate fields at Embarras 
Portage, Hay River, Fort Norman  and  Canol  Camp, a major  supply base set 
up across the Mackenzie River from  Norman  Wells. 
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The program  we  had  pleaded for became  conspicuously  successful. 
Without it, operations at Norman Wells and Canol Camp would have been 
seriously hampered. The first (2-47 (the U.S. military version of the DC-3) 
landed at Norman  Wells before the end of September. Later, C.P. Air  got  a 
contract to service Canol, but the military planes were flown by American 
pilots  and crews with the Air Transport Command of the U.S.  Air Force. 
McConachie  was  pleased that the fields  now existed. One  day  he  remarked 
to me, “Dick, I believe that if it  weren’t for you those fields  wouldn’t  have 
been  built yet.” He was being characteristically gracious, since the idea had 
been  his. 
Contrary to the suspicions of some researchers that the air fields were 
foisted on Canada by the U.S.  Army, the fact is that they were conceived  and 
promoted  by  individual  Canadians  in the conviction that they  were  aiding the 
joint war effort, and at the same time  getting for Canada  a  gift  of  enduring 
value for northern development. 
Ms. Barry was puzzled that the Mackenzie Valley fields were activated 
almost a year before the commencement of actual pipe-laying for the Norman 
Wells-Whitehorse crude oil  ine.  (Crews  worked  from  both ends toward 
Macmillan [not MacMillan] Pass to meet for a ceremonial tie-in or “golden 
weld” in February 1944). All feasible  modes of transportation were needed, 
including a winter truck and tractor road that was pushed overland from 
Peace River to Norman  Wells, to deliver  vital  freight  and passengers 
throughout the year. New wells  had to be  drilled and storage tanks had to be 
erected on both sides of the Mackenzie.  Semi-permanent  and  mobile camps 
had to be provided, and detailed  right-of-way  locating and clearing  had to be 
done before construction of the pipeline,  with its pump-station  buildings  and 
machinery. 
Ms. Barry asks what role the C.P. Air merger  played  in the “unauthorized” 
installation of the Mackenzie  Valley air fields, and what  was 
Bechtel-Price-Callahan’s part in starting construction without approaching 
Canada  through  regular channels. My answers are that the C.P. Air merger 
was coincidental and had no connection with the airfields beyond placing 
Grant McConachie  in a position where he and his  organization  could be of 
service to us; and that Bechtel-Price-Callahan, the prime  Canol contractor for 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, simply followed the client’s orders and 
had no involvement in  diplomatic procedures. If the U.S. War Department 
neglected to obtain specific authorization from Ottawa, it may have been with 
the assumption that it already had blanket authorization to resort to any 
reasonable means of completing the Canol Project in the cause of joint 
US.-Canadian defence. 
Ms. Barry asks finally whether C. D. Howe, as minister of transport, was 
the “pivotal” figure in Canada’s “ambivalent” policy regarding airports in 
the Mackenzie District. I can offer  only a conjectural answer to that question. 
C. D. Howe  may or may  not  have  known that the air fields as well as winter 
roads were being  built as part of the Canol Project (there were  many 
eyewitnesses among resident government representatives who could have 
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notified Ottawa and  probably did), but I cannot conceive of any  ambivalent 
Canadian  policy  toward them, though the noses of some Ottawa bureaucrats 
may have  been put out of joint because they  were  not  immediately  consulted 
by their Washington counterparts about every move  before  it  was  made. 
By June 15,  1942,  when  C. H. (Punch) Dickins,  vice president and  general 
manager of C.P. Air, wrote to R. A. Gibson, then deputy commissioner of the 
Northwest Territories, telling him about the projected flight strips, he must 
already have had a report from McConachie on our meeting with Colonel 
Wyman at  Fort McMurray.  In whatever discussions Dickins  had  with 
Bechtel-Price-Callahan executives concerning  air transportation for the Canol 
Project, he  must  have  been  told that they  could enter into no  binding 
agreement  with him independently; they would first require a directive from 
the War Department or from  Wyman as contracting officer to make  it 
permissible and reimbursable. As one B-P-C construction manager put it, 
“We’re just flunkies for the Army on this job.” 
Ms.  Barry cites a report by Major General W.  W. Foster, who, a year after 
Canol started, was assigned by the Canadian Cabinet War Committee to 
determine  precisely the details of American activities in the Mackenzie 
District. Approaching retirement with little or no  prior  knowledge of Canol, 
he  had to gather and summarize a mass of confusing details. He gave the date 
of 15 May 1942 for first construction on the Mackenzie  air route. This  could 
have  applied  only to the field at Fort McMurray, which  preceded  any  Canol 
groundbreaking. 
Unquestionably, the Mackenzie  Valley  air  fields constructed by  B-P-C for 
the U. S. Corps of Engineers grew out of our conference with Colonel 
Wyman, 6 June 1942. 
Contrary to Ms.  Barry’s assertion that there was a “panic” to complete the 
Norman  Wells-Whitehorse  line  by the autumn of  1942, the Corps of Engineers 
soon realized that all of the necessary preparatory work utterly precluded 
meeting that deadline. Meanwhile the Japanese forces in the Aleutians  were 
driven out and a feared threat from Japanese submarines to tankers plying the 
Pacific Coast diminished. A 1 10-mile  pipeline  was  quickly  laid over the White 
Pass to bring  imported  gasoline  from  Skagway to Whitehorse for the northerly 
half of the Alaska Highway and its airports, This was followed by other 
pipelines between Watson Lake and Fairbanks which could carry imported 
products or those from  Norman  Wells crude oil as soon as the main  pipeline 
and the Whitehorse  refinery were ready. 
By this time the urgency  surrounding the original  project was gone, but it 
was thought that it might still prove useful to divert scarce tankers from 
Alaskan waters, and with all of the essential materials delivered it was 
deemed less costly to go through  with the project than to abandon it. 
When the line  was  laid - four inches  inside  diameter except for about 110 
miles at the Whitehorse end, which  was  ix-inch  pipe - it was  not 
“carelessly put together” as Ms.  Barry asserts. It was done expeditiously  but 
professionally, thoroughly inspected and tested by experienced B-P-C 
craftsmen and engineers; having  camped  with  them and frequently filmed all 
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steps of their operations, I can testify to their thoroughness. But, like all of 
the products lines, the crude line  was  laid  on the surface of the ground  and 
was therefore vulnerable to rock  slides  and other hazards. However, 
according to Alex Hemstock, an  engineer  employed  by  Imperial  Oil at 
Norman  Wells  from 1943 to 1945, most leaks occurring  during the nearly one 
year of operation of the main  Canol  ine  were  caused  by dents or by 
inadequate factory-made longitudinal  welds rather than faulty  field  work. 
Incidentally, the Fairbanks line continued in service until long after the 
war, and the Skagway  line is still  in  use today; it  supplies  imported  diesel  fuel 
and stove oil to Whitehorse. 
In 1977, with then Commissioner S. M. Hodgson of the Northwest 
Territories, I inspected the old  Canol route from  Norman  Wells to the Yukon 
border. The pipeline  had  long  since  been cut up  and carried away  by  salvage 
crews, along  with  all equipment and  machinery worth taking.  But  some thirty 
years after the line’s abandonment there was no evidence of environmental 
damage by oil spills or traffic. The only traces of past activity were the 
battered remains of pump stations, maintenance camps, cabooses, scattered 
fuel barrels, clusters of stripped trucks and graders. The access road was 
often discernible only  by  thick growths of poplar  between stands of spruce. 
(Our impression was confumed by Peter Kershaw of the University of 
Alberta  who,  with  his  wife Linda, studied the route in detail for a doctoral 
thesis .) 
The principal flight strips carved out along the Mackenzie  Valley for the 
Canol  Project  remain  in constant use, now  paved  and  enlarged as full-fledged 
airports with all modern adjuncts. Despite whatever controversy they may 
have caused at the outset, they are monuments to Grant McConachie’s 
foresight. 
